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Disparition
de l'ayatollah
Mohammed Bakr el
Hakim
Le
rouleau
compresseur de la
guerre diabolique
s'installe en Irak
où les têtes
continuent de
tomber. Dix jours
après l'attentat
contre la représentation
des Nations unies
à Bagdad, ayant
entraîné
notamment la mort
de Sergio Vieira
de Mello, voilà
qu'une personnalité
religieuse
irakienne majeure
de l'ancienne
opposition au
gouvernement de
Saddam Hussein,
l'ayatollah Bakr
el Hakim ("le
Sage"), est
tuée, ainsi que
plus de 80 autres personnes,
dans l'explosion
d'une voiture piégée,
le 29 août, à la
sortie de la prière
dans la ville de
Najaf.
L'Irak
plonge aujourd'hui
dans une situation
équivalente en
terreur à celle
qu'a connue durant
15 ans le Liban,
qui "bénéficie"
depuis 1990 de la
paix syro-américaine
sans toutefois
pouvoir recouvrer
sa souveraineté.
Et l'on se
souvient des
personnalités
assassinées par
centaines dans des
conditions
similaires, comme
l'ambassadeur de
France Louis
Delamare (1981),
l'ambassadeur
d'Espagne Pedro
Manuel de
Aristegui (1989),
le président
maronite René
Moawad (1989) ou
le mufti sunnite
cheikh Hassan Khaled
(1989), tués dans
Beyrouth sous
l'emprise de l'armée
syrienne.
Dans la capitale
libanaise,
l’assassinat de
l’ayatollah
Mohammed Bakr el
Hakim a suscité
une vague de réprobation.
L’uléma
Mohammed Hussein
Fadlallah a déclaré
"qu’il
s’agit d’une
opération
terroriste barbare
dirigée contre
l’islam et
l’unité des
musulmans".
"Sa mort dans
ces conditions
difficiles,
notamment dans
l’Irak blessé,
constitue une
perte énorme à
plus d’un égard",
a ajouté le
dignitaire qui a
passé de
nombreuses années
dans la ville
sainte chiite de
Najaf (175 km au
sud de Bagdad). De
son côté, le
secrétaire général
du Hezbollah,
Hassan Nasrallah,
a estimé que
l’attentat qui a
coûté la vie à
l’ayatollah
Hakim "va réveiller
l’esprit de la révolution
et de la colère"
en Irak et donnera
aux Irakiens
"suffisamment
de conscience pour
être en mesure
d’affronter les
périls qui les
menacent et de
vaincre les
criminels et les
traîtres" à
l’origine de
l’attentat.
Nous
publions
ci-dessous un
portrait de
l'ayatollah el
Hakim qui vient de
paraître dans Le
Monde ainsi qu'une
interview
exclusive en
anglais publiée
il y a huit mois
dans Newsweek.
Article
paru dans le Monde
du 30 août
2003
Un
leader chiite
pro-iranien
longtemps traqué
par Saddam Hussein
Mohammed Bakr
Al-Hakim, qui a
trouvé la mort
vendredi 29 août
dans un attentat
survenu à Najaf,
avait conduit
pendant vingt
ans la
principale
organisation
d'opposition
chiite sous
l'aile
protectrice de
la République
islamique
iranienne.
Depuis son
retour en Irak,
en mai dernier,
il faisait
figure de modéré
et se montrait
conciliant avec
les Américains.
L'ayatollah
Mohammed Bakr
Al-Hakim, dont
la mort dans
l'attentat à la
voiture piégée de
Najaf a été
annoncée par
son
organisation, était
un vétéran de
la lutte contre
le régime de
Saddam Hussein,
qu'il avait fui
en s'installant
durant de
longues années
à Téhéran
sous l'aile
protectrice de
la République
islamique
chiite, dont il
apparaissait
comme proche,
au point d'être
souvent qualifié
de "Khomeiny
irakien".
A son retour en
Irak en mai
dernier, après vingt-trois
ans d'exil en
Iran, il avait néanmoins
refusé cette
image, se définissant
comme un "simple
soldat de la Révolution
islamique".
Chef du Conseil suprême
de la révolution
islamique en
Irak (CSRII),
une organisation
de chiites
irakiens
soutenue par
l'Iran et
souvent qualifiée
d'intégriste,
ce religieux de
64 ans, coiffé
d'un turban
noir, signe
qu'il se
proclame descendant
du prophète, défendait
pourtant en
apparence une
ligne modérée.
Il demandait par
exemple un départ
rapide des Américains,
mais acceptait
de collaborer
avec la
puissance
occupante, son
frère Abdel
Aziz Al-Hakim siégeant
au conseil de
gouvernement
irakien.
L'ayatollah se
disait ouvertement
opposé aux
attaques anti-américaines
et accusait
leurs auteurs d'être
des affidés de
l'ex-parti Baas.
"Nous
sommes appelés
à déployer des
efforts
pacifiques pour
obtenir la fin
de l'occupation
et nous ne
devons recourir
à la force
qu'après avoir
épuisé tous
les moyens
pacifiques et le
dialogue, ce qui
n'est pas encore
le cas",
avait déclaré
récemment le
chef du CSRII au
journal Al-Adala
(la Justice),
organe de sa
formation.
Sept
tentatives
d'attentat
Fils du grand
ayatollah Muhsin
Al-Hakim, chef
spirituel du
monde chiite
entre 1955 à
1970, il avait
trouvé refuge
en Iran en 1980,
quand
l'ayatollah
Mohammad Bakr
Al-Sadr, dont il
était le
compagnon, avait
été assassiné
par le régime
baassiste. Lui-même
opposant à
Saddam Hussein,
il avait été
arrêté à deux
reprises dans
les années
1970. En 1983,
la police
irakienne arrêta
125 membres de
sa famille avant
d'en assassiner
29. En 1988, son
frère Seyyed
Mahdi Al-Hakim
fut tué au
Soudan par des
agents du régime
irakien. Sa
famille
indiquait, un
mois après la
chute de Saddam
Hussein, que 18
autres des
siens, dont elle
était sans
nouvelle, étaient "tombés
en martyrs".
L'ayatollah
Al-Hakim, grand
homme maigre à
barbe blanche,
avait lui-même
échappé ces vingt-trois
dernières années
à sept
tentatives
d'attentat. Sa
protection avait
été considérablement
renforcée
depuis la
guerre. En décembre
1982, il avait
participé avec
d'autres à la
fondation du
CSRII,
principale
organisation
d'opposition
chiite à Saddam
Hussein, dont il
avait pris
la tête en
1984. Presque au
même moment, le
CSRII se dotait
d'un bras armé,
qui deviendra la
brigade Badr,
commandée
personnellement
par l'ayatollah
Al-Hakim et
accusée par les
Etats-Unis d'être
utilisée par Téhéran
pour entraver
les affaires américaines
en Irak. Malgré
une intense
activité
politique, cet
homme, qui
appuyait
volontiers son
discours de
mouvements hiératiques
des mains,
n'avait pas négligé
la théologie et
avait écrit une
quarantaine de
livres.
Longtemps
installé en
Iran et comptant
sur l'aide de ce
pays,
l'ayatollah
avait su
cependant garder
ses distances
vis-à-vis du
clergé iranien,
défendant une
politique
autonome. Il était
notamment
parvenu à
tisser des liens
parmi les
dirigeants
arabes, en
dehors du monde
chiite, et avait
visité ces
dernières années
plusieurs pays
de la région.
Son retour en
Irak avait donné
lieu à de
nombreuses
manifestations
de foule, mais
il n'avait pas
eu le caractère
triomphal de
celui d'Ali
Khomeiny à Téhéran
après la chute
du chah.
Interview publiée dans
Newsweek le 26
décembre 2002
Iran-based
Iraqi Opposition
Leader Seyyed Hakim
opposes Saddam
Hussein but is
cautious about
international
intervention vs.
internal rebellion
Ayatollah
Seyyed Mohammad
Baqer Hakim is the
leader of the
Supreme Council for
the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
the largest Shiite
political party in
the country. The
Iraqi government has
accused SCIRI of
acting as Iran’s
fifth column and
have jailed and
executed many of its
members since the
start of Iran-Iraq
war in 1980.
Ayatollah
Hakim, who has been
living in Iran for
the past 22 years,
claims that his
followers are the
most active
opposition to Saddam
Hussein’s
government working
inside Iraq.
Although Iran has
repeatedly expressed
its opposition to a
military attack
against Iraq as the
next step in war
against terrorism,
Ayatollah Hakim
welcomes
international
intervention to
topple Saddam. But
he says that “any
unilateral action
will remain
futile.” Ayatollah
Hakim is both highly
regarded and heavily
guarded in his host
country. He takes
part in most
official gatherings
of the Iranian
clergy ; interview
requests go through
an approval process
very similar to what
a high-ranking
Iranian official
would command.
Newsweek’s Maziar
Bahari met the
ayatollah at
SCIRI’s compound
in central Tehran.
- You’ve
said that your
ultimate goal is
“to change the
internal situation
in Iraq and liberate
it from the grip of
Saddam Hussein.”
How do you want to
achieve that ?
I
believe we can
achieve this through
carrying out United
Nation’s Security
Council resolution
No. 688. This
resolution was
proposed to the
Security Council by
France, Turkey and
the Islamic Republic
of Iran after the
gulf war in 1991.
The resolution
obliges the Security
Council to interfere
in case of violent
suppression of
civilians. But
unfortunately this
resolution has not
been put in force.
If the international
community had made a
firm decision in
carrying out its
obligations the
Iraqi people would
have been able to
change the internal
situation in Iraq. I
believe the American
secretary of State,
Colin Powell - with
all due respect -
was wrong in saying,
“the Iraqi
opposition forces
are weaker than
[Afghan] Northern
Alliance” and that
“Saddam Hussein is
stronger than the
Taliban.” I
believe the Iraqi
opposition forces
are much more
organized and
stronger than the
Northern Alliance.
Furthermore,
Saddam’s regime is
even more unpopular
than the Taliban was.
- Why then have
the opposition
forces been unable
to topple Saddam
Hussein’s
government ?
Because of violent
suppression of
people.
- Where does
Saddam’s real
strength lie ?
[Iraq’s]
intelligence and
information forces.
The intelligence
strata in Iraq are
very complicated.
There are many
security and
information
organizations
including Mokhaberat
(the central
information
organization),
Military
Information, the
Baath Party’s
Information
Organization, etc.
And each of these
organizations has a
military arm of its
own. There are also
different armies
like the People’s
Army and the Quds
Army, which Saddam
has created as a
gesture, as if
he’s going to
defend the
Palestinian
struggle.
- So you
need foreign
interference to stop
the suppression?
Foreign interference
led by the Security
Council, not a
unilateral decision
by a single country.
The international
community has a
responsibility to
act against
suppression. It
already interferes
in Iraq’s internal
affairs : it
controls its wealth,
it controls its
trades, etc. So it
has to act upon its
obligation to stop
the violent
suppression of Iraqi
people, as well.
- Whenever
we talk about
international
pressure it requires
American involvement
to make it a success.
How do you feel
about an
American-led
coalition to change
the government in
Iraq ?
The
main factor here is
that it is the
people of Iraq who
should play the main
role. The people of
Iraq are very strong
and they are ready
to topple the regime.
We witnessed that
when the people of
Iraq rose up against
Saddam Hussein after
the gulf war. But
the uprising was
violently smashed by
Saddam’s regime.
If the allied forces
didn’t support the
regime the people
would have
definitely changed
Saddam’s
government. We
expect the world
community to
pressure Saddam
Hussein politically
and militarily to
comply with U.N.
resolutions the same
way they did in
Kosovo. Putting
political pressure
first, and when it
proves unsuccessful,
exert military
pressure.
-
What if the
international
community doesn’t
want to get involved
and the Americans do
it on their own ?
Would you support
that ?
That depends on the
political situation
and timing of the
attack. We cannot
prejudge future
events before they
happen. But a
unilateral decision
will not take us
very far.
- There was
an article in New
Yorker magazine by
Seymour Hersh about
London-based Iraq
National Congress
leader Ahmad
Chalabi’s claim
that the government
of Iran “has
agreed to permit INC
forces and their
military equipment
to cross the Iranian
border into southern
Iraq.” And that
“the United States
would then begin an
intense bombing
campaign, as it did
in Afghanistan, and
airlift thousands of
Special Forces
troops into southern
Iraq.”
I haven’t read the
article and I
don’t know
anything about it.
Who are the sources
in the article ?
- I
guess Chalabi, the
INC as well as State
Department and CIA
officials. Do you
know of any deals
between the INC and
the Iranian
government ?
There
seems to be no
agreement. You’re
a journalist. You
know that sometimes
people tell the
press certain things
in order to find out
how others react to
a certain hypothesis.
But you have to ask
where are those men
who would carry out
the operation. We
would have known of
them if they existed.
Where have they
hidden them so far ?
You need a real
organization to lead
an army prepared for
such military
operation.
- How
united are different
opposition groups in
Iraq at the moment ?
There
is a great unity
among different
opposition forces
inside and outside
Iraq.
- What do
you think about the
INC and Ahmad
Chalabi in
particular ?
I don’t find it
right to talk about
specific groups and
personalities. We
have good relations
with all opposition
groups inside and
outside Iraq. There
are two kinds of
Iraqi opposition
groups. There are
those groups who are
active inside Iraq
and have political
and military
organizations inside
the country, namely
the Supreme Council
for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
the Kurdish groups
in northern Iraq and
some other groups
inside Iraq. There
are also other
opposition groups
who are very active
politically in other
parts of the world.
All these groups
have very good
relations with each
other. Even if there
are some minor
problems they would
be solved when there
is a real change
inside Iraq like
what we witnessed
during the gulf war.
- Do
all these different
groups agree about
the shape of the
future government in
Iraq ?
We
have been
negotiating with all
different groups
from different parts
of the country.
- How strong
is SCIRI inside and
outside of Iraq ?
The most active
groups inside Iraq
are SCIRI forces.
SCIRI doesn’t have
its own military
forces, but there
are many military
opposition groups
inside Iraq that
take political
guidance from SCIRI.
- Do you
receive military and
financial help from
Iran ?
Iran has welcomed us
as its guests and we
are thankful for it.
- How about
military and
financial support ?
Iran has political
relations with Iraq,
it doesn’t
interfere in
Iraq’s internal
affairs and respects
international laws
in its relations
with Iraq.
- But there
have been attacks
against People’s
Mujahedin [an
Iraqi-based Iranian
military opposition
group] inside
Iraq’s territory.
Last summer there
was an attack
against their
offices in Baghdad.
There were reports
that Iran financed
these attacks and
they were carried
out by SCIRI forces.
The munafeqqin
[hypocrites, a
Quranic term used by
the Iranian
government to
describe the
mujahedin] helped
Saddam suppress
Shiite and Kurdish
uprisings in 1991.
For the opposition
forces inside Iraq
the munafeqqin is a
legitimate target.
People of Iraq hate
them and according
to recent reports
Saddam is planning
to use the
munafeqqin in case
of a future uprising.
But those forces
that attack the
munafeqqin inside
Iraq are not
supported by Iran.
The government of
Iran doesn’t even
allow our forces to
cross the border.
The fact of the
matter is that
Saddam is trying to
use the munafeqqin
as a bargaining chip
in the relations
with Iran. He
doesn’t want us in
Iran. He wants us to
leave for Europe or
somewhere else in
world and cut our
close ties with the
people inside Iraq.
- Has the
fight between the
United States and
Iraq been reduced to
a personal animosity
with Saddam ? Is it
possible that if
Saddam is toppled
one of his sons,
Qusai, Udai or
another person close
to him, might come
to power ?
Unfortunately
it is possible. But
the people of Iraq
will not support
changing Saddam
while the structure
of the regime
remains intact.
Furthermore that
will not solve
anything. But you
can expect anything
from the American
government. The
American government
has been trying to
get rid of Saddam
Hussein for the past
10 years but it has
not been successful.
- What
do you think were
the United States’
shortcomings in the
past and what should
it do now ?
America should have
an honest approach
to the problems of
the region.
Especially regarding
its total support of
the Zionist regime [Israel],
which has shattered
America’s image in
the region. Also the
U.S. has followed a
wrong policy towards
the Islamic Republic
of Iran since the
[1979] revolution.
Regarding Iraq,
America should have
allowed the people
of Iraq to decide
their own future.
The people of Iraq
were close to
creating their own
government three
times in the past 10
years, and each time
America’s
interference blocked
their efforts. After
the gulf war in
1991, the U.S.
allowed Saddam’s
forces to suppress
the uprising of the
people of Iraq.
There was also a
plan to assassinate
Saddam and stag[e] a
coup d’etat, the
so called “silver
bullet” plan, in
1995. The Americans
revealed this plan
to the regime, and
it was defeated.
Another time
different groups
within the Iraqi
Army made an
agreement to stage a
coup and change the
government. This
plan was also
exposed by the
Americans. And
Saddam’s
government managed
to assassinate Talib
Al Soheil, the brain
behind the plan, in
Beirut.
- Some
American politicians
were afraid that
another Islamic
Republic, like Iran,
would come to power
in Iraq if Saddam
was defeated.
But that was not the
main reason that the
gulf war coalition
allowed Saddam to
suppress the
uprising. Many
Americans confessed
that it was a
collective decision
of some countries in
the region.
- Which ones
?
Some of them. I know
that [Egyptian
president] Mr. Hosni
Mubarak said that we
didn’t want a
change of government.
What you just
mentioned is a wrong
assumption by some
American politicians.
Before the gulf war,
SCIRI and 26 other
Iraqi opposition
groups took part in
a conference in
Damascus in January
1990. In that
conference after
months of
negotiations we
reached an agreement
that after
Saddam’s regime,
there will be a
multiparty
parliamentarian
interim government
for one year. After
that there would be
a referendum about
the future
government of Iraq.
We decided that Iraq
should rid itself of
weapons of mass
destruction, should
have friendly
relations with
neighboring
countries, and
should respect
international laws.
The U.S. and the
rest of the world
knew about the
outcome of the
conference and our
agreement.
- Do all 27
groups still respect
this agreement ?
Yes we do. There
have been subsequent
meetings in other
places and we have
insisted on the
validity of the
agreement reached in
Damascus in 1990.
One of the most
important issues in
the agreement is the
unity of Iraq.
Saddam is trying to
imply that after him
there will be a
break-up. But it is
just a ploy to scare
the world community
regarding the
consequences of his
fall. The truth is
that there are
Shiites, Kurds and
Sunnis all over Iraq
so the idea of a
break-up is just an
illusionary threat
created by
Saddam’s
government.
Furthermore I
don’t think the
world community nor
the countries of the
region would agree
with the break-up of
Iraq into three
parts.
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Copyright 2003 RJLiban
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